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Abstract 
 
Prior to the 1990s, the generation, transmission, distribution and retailing of electricity 
were generally carried out by integrated monopolies.  In recent decades, many 
governments have introduced reforms, where these firms are “unbundled” to aid with 
the introduction of competition into the potentially competitive generation and retailing 
segments of the industry.  The success of these reforms hinges on the degree to which 
gains from improved competition outweigh any lost scope economies.  In this paper we 
use data on 116 investor-owned utilities (IOUs) from the US in 2001 to investigate 
vertical scope economies between generation and distribution and horizontal scope 
economies between different types of generation.  Our quadratic cost function model 
includes three generation output measures (hydro, nuclear and fossil fuels), which not 
only allows the calculation of horizontal scope economies, but also allows one to 
investigate the effect that generation mix has on vertical scope economies.  Our 
empirical results provide (sample mean) estimates of vertical scope economies of 8.1%, 
horizontal scope economies of 5.4% and global scope economies of 13.5%, suggesting 
that policy makers should think carefully about unbundling reforms.  Finally, an 
extensive sensitivity analysis is used to show how the scope measures vary across 
alternative model specifications and firm types. 
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1. Introduction  
Prior to the 1990s, the generation, transmission, distribution and retailing of electricity was 
generally carried out by vertically integrated utilities, which were either state-owned 
monopolies (e.g. in most European countries) or tightly regulated private companies (e.g. in 
most parts of the United States).  In recent decades, many governments have questioned the 
degree to which all four of these components of the electricity supply industry are natural 
monopolies (Newbery, 2000).  As a consequence, they have introduced reforms aimed at 
introducing competition into the potentially competitive generation and retailing segments of 
this industry, while maintaining regulated (or government-owned) monopolies in the 
transmission and distribution segments.  In many cases, governments have argued that 
competition in the generation and retail sectors is best served by separating (or unbundling) 
the incumbent vertically integrated entities into separate generation, transmission, distribution 
and retail organisations (as well as allowing new entrants in the competitive segments).   
Following the pionerring reforms in the UK in the 1990s, commonly considered the 
gold standard for electricity sector reform (Joskow 2008), the unbundling principle has 
become an integral part of the policy packages in many countries, which have embarked on 
the process of introducing competition in their electricity markets. The economic rationale for 
vertical separation is the prevention of potential anti-competitive effects that could result from 
the exploitation of market power amongst the stages of electricity supply. However, in 
addition to this, the economic case for unbundling also implicitly relies on the premise that 
cost savings resulting from vertical integration economies, if they exist, are unlikely to be 
substantial. Otherwise, the increase in costs resulting from the loss of economies of 
integration could potentially outweigh the benefits gained from the introduction of 
competition.  
This is an important issue, which appears to have received limited attention in recent 
policy debates, perhaps because of the limited amount of empirical evidence that is available.  
Pittman (2003, p13) notes that in the electricity industry “econometric estimates of scope 
economies have yielded somewhat mixed results”. Similarly, Sirasoontorn and Quiggin 
(2007, p412), in their recent discussion of reform options in Thailand, note that “Evidence on 
network and scope economies remains ambiguous”. Therefore, in this study our focus is on 
obtaining up-to-date, robust estimates of the cost economies (or diseconomies) associated 
with vertical integration.  Moreover,  as we allow for multiple types of generation, unlike 
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most previous studies, this not only allows for better estimates of vertical economies, but can 
also provide evidence on horizontal integration economies and how a firm’s generation mix 
influences vertical, horizontal, and overall integration economies.   This information should 
provide a valuable contribution to the current debate on the relative merits of vertical and 
horizontal unbundling, where at present we observe that some governments are implementing 
an unbundling reform process, while others, for example the UK,  have  permittied mergers 
among entities that were not long ago formed by unbundling vertically integrated 
organisations. 
At the time of the early British reforms, a seminal paper by Kaserman and Mayo 
(1991) was published in The Journal of Industrial Economics. This paper estimated vertical 
economies in the US power sector, and contained various important features. First, from a 
methodological perspective, it paved the way in terms of providing a methodology for the 
measurement of economies of vertical integration. Second, at a time when various reforms 
involving vertical separation were underway, it was virtually the only available study at that 
time that provided an estimate of vertical economies. Finally, Kaserman and Mayo’s findings 
were rather challenging in that they suggested that efficiency losses resulting from splitting 
generation from the transmission/distribution of electricity were substantial.  
The empirical studies on vertical integration in the electricity industry that followed 
Kaserman and Mayo (1991) are not abundant, which is somewhat surprising given the wave 
of restructuring reforms that followed the lead of the UK. Furthermore, virtually all of these 
studies obtain estimates of substantial scope economy gains resulting from vertical 
integration.  Particularly, the most recent estimates on vertical economies with US data 
(Kwoka 2002) suggest quite substantial costs of vertical disintegration, which may lead one to 
reconsider the advisability of further unbundling. 
Given this background, this paper contributes to the literature in various ways. First, 
from a conceptual/theoretical perspective, we provide an integrated analysis of both vertical 
economies and horizontal economies (i.e. among types of generation) into an aggregate 
measure of global scope economies. Second, from an empirical perspective, we employ more 
recent data than any past US studies, which are mostly based on data from the 1980s. 
Particularly, given technological change in computer systems, and more sophisticated 
coordination mechanisms in power pools than those that existed in the 1980’s, there is reason 
to believe that there has been a change in the degree to which vertical integration is needed to 
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facilitate the coordination of electricity supply.  Third, in contrast to earlier studies, we also 
provide estimates from a variety of model specifications with alternative output definitions 
and also provide tests of statistical significance for the scope economy estimates. Finally, we 
provide an analysis of the impact of generation composition (hydro, nuclear and fossil fuel) 
on the magnitude of vertical economies, which suggests that because vertical, horizontal and 
global scope economies are dependent on the type of generation employed,  there is no “one-
size-fits-all” measure of scope economies.   
The remainder of the paper is organized into sections. Section 2 contains a 
comprehensive and updated literature review, while Section 3 provides definitions of the 
various scale and scope economies measures used in our empirical analysis.  The quadratic 
cost function and associated econometric estimation methodology is detailed in Section 4, 
followed by a description of the sample data and variable definitions in Section 5.  In Section 
6 we present and discuss our empirical results, while concluding comments are made in 
Section 7. 
 
2. Literature review 
Electric power has a number of characteristics that are key to understanding the 
interdependencies that exist between the vertical stages of the electricity supply industry. 
Thus, before reviewing the empirical literature, we first briefly summarise the most salient 
characteristics of the industry.  
2.1 Characteristics of electric power supply 
First, generators must be physically connected to customers through transmission and 
distribution facilities (i.e. a network of poles, wires, and transformers). Secondly, electricity is 
a non-storable good, which requires a continuous and instantaneous matching of resource 
output to customer loads. Third, changes in demand are instantaneously transmitted to the 
supplier, who must maintain sufficient reserves to meet the maximum contemporaneous 
demand. Finally, unlike goods in other networks (e.g. gas, water, trains, and information) 
electricity flow cannot be directed from one point to another in the transmission network over 
a specific path, like the one specified in a contract. Instead, the electric current within a 
network is governed by physical laws (Ohm’s and Kirchoff’s laws). Thus, power travels over 
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all available paths between generation and customer loads and divides itself in accordance 
with the lines’ electrical impedance1. As a result, power losses are not proportional to the 
current flowing in a circuit. Instead, losses increase with the square of the current and, 
consequently, marginal losses far exceed average losses. These laws imply that the addition of 
one more power transaction to a given network creates uncompensated externalities (e.g. 
increased network congestion and power losses).  
From the above it follows that the reliability of generating, transmitting and 
distributing functions are unavoidably interdependent. Hence, some control is necessary in 
order to regulate system frequency and stability, as well as to provide a synchronized 
response to emergencies. Further, technical interdependence among generation, transmission, 
and distribution implies that the design and operation of each vertical segment of the system 
must be carried out by taking into account the design and operation of the other segments. In 
this respect, efficient planning and investment requires the exchange of accurate information 
between vertical levels, as well as maximum protection against uncertainty and risk, given the 
large quantities of capital necessary to finance long-lasting investments in idiosyncratic 
assets. 
Consequently, the achievement of an efficient supply of electricity calls for 
considerable coordination of planning and operation both within and between the different 
vertical stages of the electric power system. Thus, short-run and long-run efficiency requires 
the coordination of generation, transmission and distribution plant investment, the economic 
dispatch of generating units, the planning and coordinating of maintenance scheduling, and 
the maintenance of adequate spinning reserves (Jurewitz, 1988).  
Due to the benefits associated with coordinated decision making, it seems reasonable 
to consider vertical integration as the organizational choice that enables the realization of such 
potential efficiencies. Thus, it was been traditionally claimed that vertical integration reduces 
transaction costs, mitigates the problems of information asymmetry, helps to lessen 
uncertainty and risk, and reduces overhead costs by sharing common resources among stages 
(e.g. Joskow and Schmalensee 1983, Landon 1983, Jurewitz 1988, Michaels 2006). In 
principle, such economies appear to be more difficult to obtain by means of coordinated 
                                                 
1 Impedance is a measure of the overall opposition of a circuit to current, in other words: how much the circuit 
impedes the flow of current. It is like resistance, but it also takes into account the effects of capacitance and 
inductance (which vary with the frequency of the current passing through the circuit). Impedance is measured in 
ohms.  
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mechanisms between independent companies each operating in different vertical segments of 
the industry. Accordingly, the unbundling required by electricity industry restructuring would 
appear to imply the loss of vertical integration economies.  
By contrast, the advocates of deregulation work under the premise that the economies 
created by vertical integration are unlikely to be great, and therefore the change in market 
structure would not entail significant costs, and therefore is likely to be more than offset by 
cost savings due to increased competition in energy supply. However, the costs associated 
with vertical unbundling are in principle empirically estimable, and are also an important 
factor to consider when assessing the benefits of industry restructuring that is designed to 
facilitate increased competition.  Nevertheless, somewhat surprisingly, empirical studies are 
not particularly abundant, as is demonstrated by Table 1, which provides an updated review of 
empirical studies examining vertical economies in the power sector.   
[Place Table 1 about here] 
2.2  Empirical Studies 
The pioneering empirical studies aimed at detecting potential advantages of vertical 
integration were centred on testing the separability of the cost or production function among 
production stages (e.g. Henderson 1985, Roberts 1986, Lee 1995, Thompson 1997, Hayashi et 
al 1997). All of these studies analyze the separability between the generation and 
transmission/distribution stages in US Investor Owned Utilities (IOU) power sector, and 
provide evidence that transmission and distribution are not separable from generation. 
Basically, this means that downstream costs depend on input usage at the generation stage, so 
firm decisions concerning input use at each stage cannot be made independently. 
Nevertheless, although the rejection of the separability hypothesis suggests the existence of 
vertical integration gains, the separability approach does not permit the quantification of the 
magnitude of such economies.  
Using a slightly different research approach, Gilsdorf (1995) tests sub-additivity and 
cost complementarity (Gilsdorf 1994) for 72 vertically-integrated US utilities in 1985. The 
utilities included in his sample produced at least 65% of their power from conventional (non-
nuclear) steam generation. He found no evidence of sub-additivity nor cost complementarity 
between generation, transmission and distribution stages (i.e. that the marginal cost of 
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producing one good does not decrease when the output of the other good increases). However, 
scope economies may exist in the absence of sub-additivity and cost complementarities 
(Baumol et al, 1982).  
Eftekhari (1989) was the first empirical study to utilise the concept of economies of 
scope to estimate the economies of vertical integration using data on a cross section of 61 US 
electric firms for 1986. He estimated a multi-stage translog cost function by applying the 
Box-Cox transformation to the output variables in the translog model, prior to estimating the 
cost function together with the corresponding input cost-share equations using Zellner’s 
(1962) iterative SUR procedure. His sample only includes firms which generated at least 80 
percent of their power by conventional steam methods and did not have any nuclear 
generating capacity. He found evidence of diseconomies of joint production between 
generation, transmission and distribution.  
Kaserman and Mayo (1991) estimates a quadratic cost function, that allows for the 
specification of stage-specific fixed costs, using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. 
Their function also includes a number of hedonic variables to account for cross-sectional 
variation in input prices that may have an influence upon a utility’s costs. They use data on 74 
privately owned electric utilities in 1981 and obtain empirical evidence of the existence of 
economies of vertical integration in the generation and transmission/distribution of electric 
supply, in contrast to the Eftekhari (1989) study. They found that vertical economies prevail 
throughout the relevant range of outputs. Particularly, they found vertical economies of 12 
percent for a firm producing the sample mean generation and distribution levels (9 and 7.3 
million MWh, respectively). Further, they estimate the degree of vertical economies for 
various levels of generation and distribution, and find that it reaches a maximum of 95% for a 
utility that generates 18 million MWh and distributes 14 million MWh (i.e. twice the mean 
values).  
Kwoka (2002) is the most recent study to utilise data for US IOUs. It involves the 
OLS estimation of a quadratic cost function using data on a cross section of 147 firms in 
1989, which provides estimated cost savings of about 42 percent for a utility producing the 
sample mean levels of output (13.6 million MWh of generated power and 15.4 million MWh 
of distribution).  These estimates are unusually large, but this may be in part a consequence of 
including wholesale sales of electricity in the distribution output measure.  
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Greer (2008) estimated a quadratic cost model using data on US rural electric 
cooperatives in 1997. As in Kaserman and Mayo (1991), the cost function is quadratic in the 
outputs and separable from input prices, which are only included as linear expressions. Greer 
reports average cost savings slightly above 40% when evaluated at the sample mean (i.e. a 
rural cooperative with a generation of 320 GWh and 300 GWh of distributed power).  
Studies from other countries are less common (refer to Table 1). These studies 
incorporate a variety of approaches and methodological refinements. Ida and Kuwahara 
(2004) found evidence of weak cost complementarities in their analysis of nine Japanese 
utilities over the 1978-98 period.  They specify a translog cost function and associated share 
equations, which is estimated using a fixed effects seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
estimator.  
Nemoto and Goto (2004) estimate a symmetric generalized McFadden cost function 
using panel data on nine Japanese electric utilities over 1981-1998. They adopt a new 
perspective by focusing on the estimation of technological externalities between the 
generation and transmission-distribution stages. Their results confirm that generation capital 
significantly raises transmission-distribution costs as if it were a negative externality. 
Consequently, their results suggest that the generation stage is inefficiently overcapitalized if 
it is separated from the transmission-distribution stage. These external diseconomies would be 
eliminated by vertical integration that enables centralized decision making over all stages.  
Jara-Díaz et al (2004) specify and estimate a quadratic cost function together with the 
corresponding input expenditure equations, on a sample of 12 Spanish utilities during the 
period 1985-1996. Together with the distribution output, they specify four different 
generation products (e.g. MWhs of power generated from coal, nuclear, oil and hydro), which 
allows estimating economies of scope at the generation level. They found that the vertical 
integration of generation and distribution of power saves around 6.5 percent of costs 
evaluated at the sample mean (8,200 GWh generation and 11,350 GWh distributed), while 
cost savings derived from the horizontal integration of diverse generation outputs into a single 
firm (as opposed to the splitting up amongst various separate specialized firms) ranged from 
9.1% to 28.1%.   
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Fraquelli et al (2005) test for the presence of economies from vertical integration using 
a sample of 25 Italian local electric utilities. They estimate a composite cost function2 and the 
associated input cost share equations using a non-linear iterated SUR (NLSUR) estimator. 
They found statistically significant vertical economies of 3 percent for the average firm 
(which generates about 300 million kWh and distributes about 600 million kWh). 
Houldin (2005) studies the case of the Ontario (Canada) power system, using an 
accounting based analysis of total cost figures of the electricity industry before and after its 
restructuring. While, the methodology employed to measure vertical economies is not 
documented, the paper concludes that vertical unbundling provoked a loss of scale and scope 
economies, and this increased real average costs by 5 percent.  
Finally, Arocena (2008) estimated economies of vertical integration and economies of 
diversification in generation in a sample of Spanish utilities by means of Data Envelopment 
Analysis. Further, the potential gains of vertical and horizontal integration are evaluated not 
only on the basis of cost savings but also on the increase in the quality of service attributable 
to integration. This study found evidence that vertical integration reduces cost and improves 
quality in the range of 1.1 to 4.9 percent, whereas economies of horizontal integration in 
generation range between 1.3 and 4.3 percent. 
The discussion above and the summary material contained in Table 1 shows that past 
studies have come to a range of conclusions regarding the degree of vertical scope economies.  
These differences are likely to be the consequence of a variety of factors, some of which are 
outlined below. 
• Data sourced from a variety of countries in a variety of time periods. 
• A few studies consider generation output measures disaggregated by type, while 
most studies restrict their attention to one type of generation (fossil fuels) or 
alternatively aggregate differing generation types into a single output measure. 
• Studies use a variety of distribution output measures, such as customer numbers 
versus the amount of electricity delivered. 
                                                 
2 The composite cost function is quadratic in the output vector and log quadratic (like a translog function) in the 
input price vector. 
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• Some studies include a range of extra variables in their models, such as regional 
dummy variables, output activity dummy variables (to capture fixed costs) and 
various production characteristics (relating to density, etc.). 
• Some studies use single-equation econometric estimation methods, such as 
ordinary least squares (OLS), while others use multi-equation methods, such as 
SUR, with the latter approach potentially allowing one to obtain more efficient 
estimates. 
• A number of different functional forms are considered, including the translog 
functional form which does not permit zero output values and hence does not 
allow the calculation of the standard economies of scope measures. 
• A number of studies impose the restriction that the cross-product terms between 
output quantities and input prices are equal to zero.  This restrictive assumption 
implies that output composition has no influence on how a firm reacts to changes 
in the relative input prices of capital, labour, etc. 
In our empirical analysis we attempt to consider as many of these issues and modelling 
approaches as possible.  In terms of data, we make use of more recent data from the US 
electricity industry, as data in past studies is two decades or more old.  In terms of modelling, 
we estimate a quadratic cost function (involving non-zero cross products) using SUR 
methods.  In order to allow an analysis of horizontal integration issues, we include three 
generation output variables (nuclear, hydro and fossil generation) in our model, but also study 
the impact of aggregation on our results by estimating models with a single aggregate output 
variable.  While we argue that distribution output is best proxied by a measure of customer 
connections, we also do some sensitivity analysis and provide alternative estimates with 
distribution output defined with a MWh’s delivered measure.  Finally, we consider a range of 
additional variables, including regional dummy variables, output activity dummy variables 
and other operating characteristics, so as to investigate the sensitivity of our results to their 
inclusion.   
 
3. The measurement of scale and scope economies   
In this section we define the measures of scale and scope economies that are utilised in the 
empirical analysis. 
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3.1 Scale economies 
The degree of scale economies defined over the entire product set N, at y, is given by (Panzar 
and Willig, 1977) 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )∑
=
=∇⋅= n
i
ii
N
yCy
yC
yCy
yCyS
1
, [1] 
where  is a n×1 vector of products, C(y) is the cost function and 
( ) ( )
i
i y
yCyC ∂
∂=   is the marginal cost of product i. 3 There are said to be increasing, decreasing 
or constant returns at y if SN (y) is greater than, equal to, or less than unity, respectively. 
Therefore, if increasing returns to scale are present, (SN > 1), a proportional growth of all 
products induces a less than proportionate increase in costs. 
When a firm exhibits (SN > 1), marginal cost at y are lower than average cost, implying 
that the firm could lower its average cost by expanding production. Since the firm would gain 
from increased production, it is said to be operating with economies of scale (or size). 
Conversely, if (SN < 1) then at y the potential proportional change in cost would exceed the 
proportional change in output and thus, the firm is operating with diseconomies of scale.   
The above concept of global scale economies relates to proportional changes in all the 
quantities in the entire product set. However, as Baumol, et al (1982) notes, another 
analytically important way in which the magnitude of a firm’s operations may change is 
through variation in the output of one product, holding the quantities of other products 
constant. Product-specific scale economies are therefore based on changes in costs when one 
output quantity changes while all other outputs are held constant. Product-specific economies 
of scale for yi are therefore defined as: 
( ) ( ) ( )
i
i
ii
iN
ii
i
i C
AIC
Cy
yCyC
Cy
ICyS =−== − ,  [2] 
                                                 
3 Chambers (1988) calls this measure elasticity of size to distinguish it from the more common elasticity of scale.  
They only coincide if the production function is homothetic and, the cost function is separable. 
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where ICi represents the incremental cost of producing output i, C(yN-i) is the cost of jointly 
producing all the outputs except output i,4 and AICi represents the average incremental cost, 
i
i
i y
ICAIC = .  
Thus, the degree of product-specific economies of scale for yi is measured by the ratio 
of AICi for the product relative to its marginal cost.  AIC is analogous to ray average cost.  
Returns to scale with respect to output type i are said to be increasing, constant or decreasing 
as Si is greater than, equal to, or less than unity, respectively. 
It is also possible to define an alternative scale economy measure that is specific to a 
subset of outputs T ⊆ N as: 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )T T N TT j j j jj T j T
IC y C y C y
S y
y C y y C y
−
∈ ∈
−= =∑ ∑  [3] 
Returns to scale economies specific to the product subset T are said to be increasing, 
decreasing or constant as ST (y) is greater than, less than or equal to unity, respectively. Note 
that equation [3] is equal to equation [1] when T = N.   
This measure is particularly useful, in a vertically integrated structure.  Thus, if T 
denotes the subset of upstream products, and N-T the subset of downstream products, 
equation [3] reports the degree of stage-specific scale economies.  For example, if T is the 
subset of power generation products and N-T consists of the subset of power distribution 
products, then equation [3] captures the degree of generation-specific scale economies, and an 
analogous measure could be constructed for the N-T subset to measure distribution-specific 
scale economies.   
3.2 Scope economies  
In addition to the potential for scale economies, there also exists the possibility of 
obtaining cost savings resulting from the joint production of a bundle of products in a single 
company, as contrasted with their separate production in specialized firms. Economies of 
scope are said to exist if it is more efficient to produce several different products within a 
                                                 
4 That is, yN-i=(y1,y2,…,yi-1, 0, yi+1,…,yn). 
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single diversified firm than splitting up the production of each product, or subset of products, 
between separate specialized firms.  
Hence, scope economies relate to the increment of costs resulting from splitting up the 
output set into two product lines T and N-T, where the output vectors of specialized firms are 
restricted to be orthogonal to one another, that is, such that 0=?i jy y , i≠j.  Economies of 
scope are said to exist if the following condition holds 
( ) ( ) ( )T N T NC y C y C y−+ >  [4] 
and diseconomies of scope occur if the inequality is reversed.  
The degree of scope economies at y relative to T is defined as 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) T N T NT N
C y C y C y
SC y
C y
−+ −= . [5] 
Fragmenting the production into these two subsets increases, decreases or leaves 
unaltered the total cost when SCT (y) is greater than, less than or equal to zero, respectively. In 
other words, if SCT (y) >0 it is cheaper to jointly produce all of the products in vector y than to 
separately produce the output vectors yT and yN-T.  
Variation in a firm’s scope of operations may result in the vertical and/or horizontal 
dimension. As an example, in the case of a pure generating company, vertical scope expands 
if it enters the distribution business. In contrast, a change in the firm’s horizontal scope refers 
to a change in the degree of product diversification within a specific stage of the vertical 
chain. For example, this occurs when a hydro generating company modifies its production 
mix by adding nuclear or thermal power generation.  
Given the distinction between vertical and horizontal scope, if T denotes the subset of 
upstream products, and N-T the subset of downstream products, then equation [5] measures 
the degree of vertical integration economies.  For example, if N denotes the full output set, T 
is the subset of power generation products and N-T consists of the subset of power 
distribution products, then equation [3] captures the degree of generation-specific scale 
economies. In the same vein, if N refers to generation outputs only, T a subset of certain 
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generation types (e.g. nuclear generation), with N-T including those generation products not 
included in T (e.g. thermal generation) then equation [5] identifies the economies of 
horizontal diversification in the generation stage. 
Following Baumol et al (1982: 74), a further basic relationship emerges when we 
divide the product set N into two disjoint subsets T and N-T, a relationship that highlights the 
integral role played by economies of vertical integration in the relationship between stage-
specific scale economies and aggregate scale economies: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ySC
ySySyS
T
TNTTT
N −
−+= −
1
1 αα , [6] 
where  
jNj
j
jTj
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yCy
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∑
∈
∈
)(
)(
α . 
Equation [6] indicates that in the absence of interdependencies between products in T 
and N-T (i.e. SCT(y) = 0), the degree of global scale economies SN(y) is simply a weighted 
sum of its component product-specific scale economies. Thus, if T refers to the generation 
outputs and N-T the distribution outputs, then equation [6] indicates the way in which the 
economies of vertical integration SCT(y) magnify the effects of stage-specific scale economies 
in the determination of overall scale economies.  When SCT(y) > 0, the denominator in [6] is 
less than one, and SN(y) is larger than the weighted sum of the stage-specific scale economies. 
Therefore, even if scale diseconomies are present in both stages, the presence of sufficiently 
strong economies of vertical integration can result in the presence of scale economies over the 
entire product set.  
3.3 Overall scope and the economies of full specialisation 
Given the potential presence of both horizontal and vertical scope economies, we extend the 
approach of previous studies and next emphasize the degree of overall scope economies as a 
measure that aggregates the diverse sources of economies of integration in a multi-stage 
context. 
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Let us consider a firm that produces n products, of which k are produced upstream 
(e.g. generation) and n-k are produced downstream (e.g. distribution). Let N be the entire set 
of n products produced by the firm. Let us now consider two subsets of N 
NSU ⊆ and NSD ⊆ , such that   N,SS DU =∪ and  0=∩ DU SS . SU  includes the upstream 
products yU = (y1, y2,…, yk) and SD including the downstream products yD = (yk+1,…, yn). Let 
{ }pU TTTP ,...,, 21=  be a non-trivial partition of SU. That is, 
  0  for  .  0,   1∪ = ∩ = ≠ ≠ >i i U i j iT S , T T i j T p . Similarly, let { }qD TTTP ,...,, 21=  be a non-
trivial partition of SD, such that  0  for  .  0,   1∪ = ∩ = ≠ ≠ >i i D i j iT S , T T i j T q . 
There are horizontal economies between upstream products in yU with respect to the 
partition PU  if 
( ) ( )Uk
i
i yCyC >∑
=1
 [7] 
There are horizontal economies between downstream products in yD with respect to 
the partition PD if 
( ) ( )Dn
ki
i yCyC >∑
+= 1
. [8] 
There are vertical economies between upstream and downstream stages in y if  
( ) ( ) ( )U D NC y C y C y+ >  [9] 
 Finally, we define the degree of multistage or global scope economies at y as:  
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 1= = +
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − + + −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦=
+ +=
∑ ∑k ni U i D U D N
i i k
N
N
U D
N
C y C y C y C y C y C y C y
GSC y
C y
HE HE VE
C y
 [10] 
where HEU measures the cost savings derived from the horizontal integration between 
upstream products, HED represents the cost savings from horizontal diversification 
downstream, and VE is the cost savings from vertical integration between both stages.  If 
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GSCN(y) >0 this indicates that the costs of producing all products jointly in a single company 
is strictly lower than producing the same levels of products in n separated specialized units. 
That is, equation [10] compares the costs of full integration with those of full specialization, 
and thereby indicating the degree of aggregate or overall scope economies as the proportion 
of such cost savings on the total integrated costs. However, equation [10] also indicates that 
regardless of whether overall scope economies are present, one or more of upstream 
horizontal economies, downstream horizontal economies and vertical economies may or may 
not be present.   
 
4. Empirical model specification  
We use a quadratic cost function, which is a flexible functional form (i.e. it provides a second 
order approximation to any arbitrary functional form) and also has the advantage that it is 
well defined for zero output values. This latter feature, which is particularly important for 
measuring scope economies, is not satisfied by some other popular flexible forms, such as the 
translog cost function. 
The quadratic cost function specification can be written as follows:   
0
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
2 2
n m n n m m
i g gi g gi gj gi ji gj gi ji
g g g j g j
CT y w y y w wα β δ β γ
= = = = = =
= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑    
  
1 1 1
n m h
gj gi ji g gi
g j g
y w Zθ ψ
= = =
+ +∑∑ ∑ ,   i=1, 2, … , f.         [11] 
where CTi = total costs of the i-th firm, ygi = quantity of output g, wgi = price of input g, Zgi = 
operating variables, n = number of outputs, m = number of inputs, h = number of operating 
variables, f = number of firms in the sample and the Greek characters represent unknown 
parameters to be estimated.    
By applying Shephard’s Lemma to equation [11], and given the assumption of symmetry 
for the β and γ parameters, we obtain the m factor demand equations as:  
1 1
m n
i
gi g gj ji jg ji
j jgi
CTx w y
w
δ γ θ
= =
∂= = + +∂ ∑ ∑ ,   i=1, 2, … , f,   g=1, 2, … , m. [12] 
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where xgi = the quantity of input g.  
For the purpose of econometric estimation, we append disturbance terms, vgi, to the m+1 
mathematical equations defined in [11] and [12] to produce the set of m+1 stochastic 
equations in [13] and [14].   
  
0
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
2 2
n m n n m m
i g gi g gi gj gi ji gj gi ji
g g g j g j
CT y w y y w wα β δ β γ
= = = = = =
= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑    
  0
1 1 1
n m h
gj gi ji g gi i
g j g
y w Z vθ ψ
= = =
+ + +∑∑ ∑ ,   i=1, 2, … , f        [13] 
1 1
m n
i
gi g gj ji jg ji gi
j jgi
CTx w y v
w
δ γ θ
= =
∂= = + + +∂ ∑ ∑ ,   i=1, 2, … , f   g=1, 2, … , m. [14] 
 
Each of these disturbance terms are assumed to have zero mean, constant variance and to 
be uncorrelated (i.e. 2( ) 0,   E( ) ,   ( ) 0,   ,gi gi gg gi gjE v v E v v i jσ= = = ∀ ≠   i,j=1, 2, … , I, g=0, 2, 
… , m).  They are designed to capture those factors which differ across the firms but are not 
captured by the included regressor variables, such as the effects of strikes, bad weather, etc.  
Furthermore, we allow for the possibility that there may be contemporaneous correlation 
across equations for a particular firm (i.e. ( ) ,   ( ) 0,   ,gi qi gq gi qjE v v E v v i jσ= = ∀ ≠  i,j=1, 2, … , 
I, g,q=0, 2, … , m).  For example, when particular weather conditions impact on a firm they 
are likely to affect more than one equation. 
The unknown parameters in the system of m+1equations, comprising the total cost 
equation [13] and factor demand equations [14], are estimated using Zellner’s (1962) iterative 
estimating procedure for seemingly unrelated regressions (ITSUR). Following standard 
practice, variables are expressed as deviations from their respective sample means, which 
permits a direct interpretation of the first order parameters as estimates of marginal effects at 
the sample mean. 
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Linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed by normalizing total cost and the input 
prices by an arbitrarily chosen input price variable (the m-th).  In addition, we impose cross-
equation restrictions to ensure symmetry in the second cross-partial derivative terms (Youngs’ 
Theorem). Other regularity conditions involving inequality restrictions, such as monotonicity 
and concavity are checked at each data point in our empirical analysis. 
 
5. Sample Data  
5.1 The sample 
Data for 116 Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) for the year 2001, was sourced from the Platts 
Powerdat Database, where the primary source of this data is FERC Form 1 or other related 
regulatory returns. Table 2 presents sample descriptive statistics of the variables, while Table 
3 illustrates the diversity in the sample by providing sample averages for various firm types 
observed in the data.  An important feature of our database is that it includes a wide variety of 
firm sizes, as well as an ample diversity of types and degrees of vertical integration. Thus, as 
Table 3 illustrates, our sample includes not only generation only, distribution only, and highly 
vertically integrated utilities, but also a wide sample of firms with varying degrees of vertical 
integration.  Moreover, our sample also includes wide variation in the degree of horizontal 
diversification in generation, as it includes examples of firms that specialize in a single 
generation technology, two generation technologies, and highly diversified generators using 
all three generation types indentified in our study.5 
 [Place Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 
5.2 Definitions of variables  
Outputs 
In terms of electricity generation, the majority of past studies (refer to Table 1) have specified 
one single generation output variable as the quantity of power generated (G) in Mwhs.  One 
notable exception was Jara-Díaz et al (2004) where separate output measures were specified 
                                                 
5 This diversity in firm types is very important when estimating a cost function for the purpose of calculating 
scope economies, because it reduces the likelihood that we are making use of cost function predictions that are 
outside of the range of our sample data.  Hence, we are able to obtain estimates which have lower standard errors 
than would otherwise be the case if our data set was not as diverse as it is. 
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for power generated from different sources.  In our analysis, we also consider separate 
generation output measures, namely: generation with conventional fossil fuels (G1), nuclear 
generation (G2) and hydro generation (G3).6 This disaggregation has a number of advantages.  
First, we argue that this avoids potential misspecification error by allowing for the 
considerable differences across these three technologies. 7  Second, it allows us to investigate 
both the horizontal and vertical relationships that exist between generation and distribution 
activities, as discussed in the previous sections.8 
Regarding the measurement of the output of the distribution activity, the studies listed 
in Table 1 have mostly used the amount of energy delivered in Mwh’s (D1) as their 
distribution output measure.  A few of these studies have instead used the number of 
customers served (D2).  In our experience, we have found that customer numbers is the key 
cost driver in empirical analyses of electricity distribution.  This is supported by a number of 
authors, such as Weiss (1975), Neuberg (1977), Wangensteen and Dahl (1990), Salvanes and 
Tjøtta (1994) and Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996).  Hence we use customer numbers as our 
preferred distribution output measure.  However, given the popularity of the D1 measure, we 
also run some extra models to test the sensitivity of our results to this choice.9    
 
Input prices, quantities and costs 
The Total Costs (TC) measure includes operation and maintenance costs from generation and 
distribution related activities, overhead expenses and capital costs (KC) calculated using a 
capital price (K) obtained using the weighted average cost (WACC) of the capital stock plus 
depreciation costs.  Purchased power expenses and transmission costs are excluded so as to 
                                                 
6 We also investigate the sensitivity of our results to this disaggregation, by estimating a model with an aggregate 
generation measure (G), as shown below. 
7 Some previous studies have included dummy variables for distribution and generation activities in order to 
allow for what they term “stage-specific fixed costs”, although we are inclined to question the theoretical 
justification for this in a long-run cost function model. Similarly, previous studies with a single generation output 
have controlled for generation mix with either dummy variables indicating generation types or generation share 
variables. Given the past literature, we have tested the appropriateness of this approach by allowing for dummy 
variables for each of the four potential distinct activities that our sample of IOUS actually engage in, which are 
Distribution, Conventional Generation, Nuclear Generation and Hydroelectric Generation. As expected, we find 
that the inclusion of these dummy variables is only statistically significant in those models that assume a single 
aggregate generation output, which by definition cannot capture the cost implications of different generation 
technologies. We therefore have excluded any further consideration of these activity dummy variables from the 
main text. 
8 Note that generation from renewable sources (wind and geothermal) were very minor in this 2001 data (less 
than 0.001% for the average firm) and hence are not included in the analysis. 
9 Additionally, we note that given the development of retail competition in electricity supply, our study carefully 
defines distribution outputs to include both full service customers, for which the company is responsible for both 
power and distribution, and distribution only customers for whom the company distributes power which is 
provided by another company.   
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properly model the underlying production relationship between distribution and generation 
activities.  The WACC estimates are those reported in the Platts Database and employ historic 
cost net plant data, as originally reported in FERC Form 1 as the basis for a measure of the 
quantity of capital stock (XK), thereby following common regulatory practice.  Depreciation 
expenses are calculated following Gilsdorf’s (1994) assumptions of declining balance 
depreciation expenses.10   
Measures of fuel price and quantity tend to be fairly standard in most past studies, with 
fuel quantity (XF) measured in BTUs and fuel price (F) estimated as expenditure on fuel (FC) 
divided by BTUs of fuel consumption.  However, given that we have defined separate 
generation output variables in our model, we believe that it is important to also include 
separate fuel price measures for fossil fuels and nuclear fuels.  Thus, by using data on fossil 
fuel costs (CF1) and nuclear fuel costs (CF2) and the quantities of the two fuels measured in 
BTUs (XF1 and XF2), we can derive prices for fossil fuels (F1) and nuclear fuel (F2).  We 
would argue that the incorporation of these two fuel price variables allows a richer 
specification of the relationship between different generation technologies, fuel prices, and the 
resulting estimated economies of integration. Most importantly, this removes the questionable 
assumption that nuclear and conventional generators face common fuel prices and marginal 
costs.11 
Measures of labour price (L) and quantity (XL) were problematic because a considerable 
number of firms had missing data on the number of employees.  Hence we chose to measure 
the labour price using state-level US Census estimates of average wages paid by IOUs.  The 
quantity of labour is then calculated implicitly as total labour costs (LC) divided by this 
labour price.  These measures are arguably better than those measures that we could have 
defined if we had access to complete data on employee numbers, because of the likely 
differences in the average skill levels of employees across different firms which tend to 
outsource low skill jobs (e.g. security and cleaning) to differing degrees. 
                                                 
10 We have also tested the application of Gilsdorf’s approach to adjusting historic cost net plant data with Handy-
Whitman based capital deflators so as to better reflect economic capital costs.  However, as we have found that 
our results are not particularly sensitive to this adjustment, we have chosen to report estimates with capital cost 
estimates based on actual reported historic cost net plant data.  The alternative estimates are available upon 
request from the authors. 
11 To further improve the model’s consistency with economic theory, we do not assume a zero fuel price for 
distribution only companies as well as generating companies that do not engage in fossil fuel or nuclear based 
generation. Instead, firms with zero fuel consumption are assumed to face an opportunity cost for fuel equivalent 
to that of the average estimated fuel price for those firms with fuel consumption. 
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The final input variable that we define is an Other Costs (OC) variable.  This is a catch-all 
variable that includes diverse items such as office supplies, outsourced services, etc.  A lack 
of detailed data on the components in this category, combined with degrees of freedom 
considerations, means that we have specified a single aggregate measure to capture these 
items.  A State-level Census Bureau index of average wages for all employees is used to 
proxy price differences across States.12  The quantity measure is then obtained implicitly by 
deflating the cost measure by this price index. 
Other characteristics 
A number of previous studies (documented in Table 1) have employed a wide variety of 
dummy variables and operating characteristics in order to control for differences in the 
operating environment faced by electric utilities. In this study we also investigate the 
influence of a number of these variables.    
We consider the use of regional dummy variables in order to control for regional 
heterogeneity not otherwise controlled for in the model.  These regions are based on the 10 
regional areas identified by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) in 2001, 
and are illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
[Place Figure 1 about here] 
 
We have also considered a number of variables that are designed to capture 
differences in operating characteristics across firms.  These variables include DENSITY 
(average amount of electricity delivered per customer); RESDENS (average amount of 
electricity delivered per residential customer); NRESDENS (average amount of electricity 
delivered per non-residential customer); OHSHARE (proportion of distribution lines that are 
on overhead poles, as opposed to being underground); LOADFACT (average hourly demand 
dived by peak hourly demand), SYSTEMUT (power generated dived by generation capacity), 
are identified and defined in Tables 2 and 3.  
Finally, given the development of retail competition in electricity services we also 
include a previously unused operating characteristic variable, DSHRFULL, which is defined 
as the proportion of all customers served by a distribution operator who are full service 
                                                 
12 In an ideal world, we would have used a State-level price index of non-labour, non-capital and non-fuel inputs 
used in IOUs, however no such index was available.  After an extensive search, we selected this price index 
because we believe that a substantial portion of the other costs aggregate, such as outsourced services, will be 
heavily influenced by state level differences in the cost of living that are closely related to wage differentials. 
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customers rather than distribution only customers.13  This variable serves as a measure to test 
whether our model results are sensitive to differences in observed levels of retail competition.  
 
 
6. Estimation results 
In this section we report the results of our empirical analysis.  As noted in our review of the 
literature (see summary in Table 1), past studies have reported a wide range of estimates of 
vertical scope economies, ranging from 3% to 42% (evaluated at sample mean data points).  
However, these studies have used a variety of data sets, methods and variables in their 
analyses.  Thus, in our empirical analysis we have decided to report results for a range of 
models, so as to attempt to identify the degree to which some of these modelling choices may 
be impacting upon the scope measures obtained. 
 In this section we present and discuss a number of tables of empirical results: 
• Table 4 reports likelihood values and likelihood ratio tests for a variety of model 
specifications; 
• Table 5 reports cost elasticities, economies of scale, scope economy and cost estimates 
(evaluated at the sample means) for a variety of models; 
• Table 6 reports disaggregated horizontal scope economy estimates (evaluated at the 
sample mean) that  allow better identification of integration economies between 
specific generation types; 
• Tables 7 reports excess costs  estimates (evaluated at the sample means) for 14  
different vertical and horizontal partitions of  the output vector; 
• Table 8 reports global, vertical, and horizontal scope economy estimates for various 
different firm sizes (with output mix held constant); and 
• Tables 9 reports vertical, horizontal and global scope economy estimates for various 
different generation mixes and integration assumptions (with firm scale held constant 
at the sample average). 
We now discuss each of these tables in turn.   
                                                 
13 Models with this variable defined based on the proportion of units delivered as opposed to proportion of 
customers served were also tested, but they did not materially differ from the results reported below.   
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Table 4 contains log likelihood function (LLF) and LR test values corresponding to a 
variety of different models. We consider six different output-quantity/input-price 
specifications.  Model (i) is our preferred model, where we have three generation output 
variables (G1, G2, G3), customer numbers (D2) as the distribution output variable and two 
fuel price variables (F1, F2).  The remaining five models provide some alternatives which 
allow us to investigate the sensitivity of the results to these choices.  Model (ii) is the same as 
Model (i) except that we use MWh delivered (D1) as the distribution output variable.  Models 
(iii) and (iv) are, respectively, the same as Models (i) and (ii), except that we now employ a 
single aggregate fuel price variable (F) instead of two disaggregated measures.  Lastly, 
Models (v) and (vi) differ from Models (iii) and (iv) in that they have only the aggregated 
generation output variable (G) instead of the three disaggregated generation variables. As 
discussed earlier, we also consider regional dummies and a set of seven operating 
characteristics. As a consequence we estimate 6×3=18 different models and report their LLF 
values in Table 4. 
The first set of LR tests in Table 4 test for the degree to which the additional variables 
(regional dummies and operating characteristics) are significant additions to the model.  First 
we note that the operating characteristics are always jointly and individually insignificant 
additions to the models.  Second, we note that the regional dummy variables are always 
jointly statistically significant. Given this, all subsequent analysis of the reported results is 
based on models which include regional dummies only. 
The second set of LR tests in Table 4 conduct tests of the generation output 
aggregation.  These restrictions are strongly rejected at the 5% level, indicating that 
aggregation of the generation outputs cannot be accepted in these data.  Similarly, the final set 
of LR tests in Table 5 demonstrate that the restriction of parameters consistent with the 
imposition of a single fuel price model, is strongly rejected, thereby demonstrating the 
superiority of the two fuel price specification on a statistical basis.14  
Finally, we are unable to use standard tests to compare Models (i) and (ii) because 
they are not nested in each other.  However, a comparison of LLF values suggests that Model 
(i) is a better fit of the sample data, supporting our above choice of customer numbers (D2) as 
our preferred measure of distribution output. Thus, we feel confident in using Model (i) as our 
                                                 
14 We note that as the two fuel models require the specification of an additional input share equation, the single 
fuel specifications (iii) through (vi) are not nested in the two fuel specifications (i) and (ii).  The reported test 
statistics for the restriction to a single fuel price are therefore based on the restriction of parameters in this 
specification to be consistent with a single fuel specification.   
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preferred model for our  detailed analysis of integration economies.  However, before we look 
at this model in more detail, we will first consider how sensitive the scope measures are to 
these modelling choices. 
 
[Place Table 4 about here] 
 
6.1 The magnitude of scale and scope economies 
Table 5 reports various scale and scope, cost elasticity and cost estimates for the sample 
average firm for the six models referred to above. Let us first consider the scale economies.  
As shown in Table 5, the estimates of the degree of global economies of scale (EOS) 
computed according to equation [1], is quite consistent across the six models, ranging from 
1.008 to 1.035. However, in all cases we cannot reject the hypothesis that EOS equals 1 at the 
5% level, therefore suggesting the existence of constant economies of scale. This is consistent 
with much of the empirical literature in this industry, which generally indicates that scale 
economies in both generation and distribution exhaust for relatively modest sizes.15 
[Place Table 5 about here] 
Despite the consistency of the EOS estimates across the specifications, the distribution 
(generation) cost elasticities are remarkably lower (higher) in models including distribution 
customers as an output. As Table 2 shows that average generation costs are 69% of total costs, 
this suggests that inclusion of distribution customers is important if we wish to properly 
model total costs. This is intuitively logical as ultimately distribution costs are related more to 
infrastructure required to provide connections to customers rather than the volume of power 
delivered to customers. 
Following expression [3] we have computed stage-specific economies of scale. Table 5 
shows that generation-stage specific scale economies range from 0.911 to 0.966 and are 
significantly less than 1 in all models, therefore suggesting diseconomies of scale in 
generation. The degree of distribution-stage specific economies of scale ranges from 0.899 to 
0.980, with 4 of the 6 estimates, including all of the models with D2 as the distribution output, 
being significantly less than 1. These results indicate that the average firm exhibits decreasing 
                                                 
15 See Christensen and Greene (1976), Huettner and Landon (1978), Joskow (1987), Lee (1995), Salvanes and 
Tjøtta (1994), Yatchev (2000), Jara-Díaz et al (2004), amongst others. 
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or constant returns to scale, at best, in the distribution stage. This is consistent with Kaserman 
and Mayo (1991), who estimate that stage-specific scale economies are exhausted around 5 
and 8 million MWh for distribution and generation respectively, well below our average firm, 
which generates 14.6 million Mwh, distributes 16.9 million and serves 619,200 customers. 
Salvanes and Tjøtta (1994) and Yatchew (2000) provide evidence from Norway and Canada 
respectively, and find that minimum efficient scale is achieved by utilities with about 20,000 
customers, while larger firms exhibit modest decreasing returns to scale.  
Given these stage specific economies of scale estimates, calculation of overall scope 
economies in the absence of vertical scope economies with expression [6], reveals that the 
degree of global scale estimates range from 0.942 to 0.967 with all but one of the estimates 
being significantly different than 1. Therefore, this demonstrates that the average firm would 
suffer scale diseconomies if vertical scope economies were not present. 
Regarding vertical scope economies, computed according to expression [5], Table 5 
shows that the estimates range from 4.3 to 9.7 percent and are always statistically significant. 
In the preferred Model (i) vertical economies are estimated to be 8.1%. Translated into dollar 
terms, the estimated cost savings associated with vertical scope economies is 64.7 million 
dollars. Scaling this cost saving up, if all 116 firms in the sample were “reorganized” into 116 
identical firms with the same characteristics as the sample average firm, vertical scope 
economies would be responsible for a costs saving of 7.5 billion dollars. 
Putting this result in the policy perspective, if vertical separation between distribution 
and generation was imposed on the sample average firm, this would imply that the cost 
savings from competition in generation would need to at least offset this substantial loss 
before any net benefit from competition could be reaped. As generation amounts to an 
estimated 69% of costs for the sample average firm, a rough estimation based on model (i) 
suggests that stand alone generation costs would need to be reduced by 10.8% just to offset 
lost vertical scope economies.   
The estimated economies of full horizontal integration in generation range from 3.4 to 5.4 
percent of integrated costs. Translated into dollar terms, the cost savings associated with 
horizontal scope economies range from 27.0 to 43.5 million dollars, with the highest results 
being for Model (i). While these estimates are always statistically insignificantly different 
from zero, this does not imply that horizontal economies are unimportant. Instead, as Table 6 
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demonstrates, for our preferred model, significant horizontal economies are present between 
certain types of generation. Thus, there are statistically significant scope economy benefits 
that accrue from the combination of hydro generation (G3) with G1 and/or G2.  This is  
consistent with the fact that hydro is employed as a peak power source, and largely 
complements the operation of base load power plants. 
[Place Table 6 about here] 
Next we compute expression [10] to compare the costs of a fully disintegrated firm consisting 
of a separate distribution firm and separate fossil fuel, nuclear, and hydro generation firms, 
with the costs of a fully integrated firm. Table 5 shows that cost savings range from 9.6 to 
13.7 percent across the models. Translated into dollar terms, the cost savings associated with 
global scope economies range from 77.0 to 110.4 million dollars. The results are statistically 
significant in three of the four multiple generation models and considerably higher in models 
including two fuel prices.   
Taken as a whole, the global, vertical, and horizontal scope economy results suggest that, 
for the sample average firm, substantial cost savings accrue from both the vertical integration 
of distribution and the horizontal integration of generation, but the savings from vertical 
integration are both larger and more statistically significant.   
6.2  The costs of alternative partitions of the sample average firm16 
The vertical, horizontal, and global scope economy measures we have considered so far 
involve only 3 of the 15 potential structural configurations of the sample average firm’s 
output vector.  Moreover, they effectively measure only the most radical options of 
completely vertically and/or horizontally separating production. As scope related costs 
interactions will differ for different outputs, alternative partitions of the output vector, would 
result in alternative costs.  Table 7 therefore shows the costs resulting for all possible 
partitions of the sample average’s output vector, computed using the parameters of our 
preferred Model (i), which are presented in the Appendix. 17 
                                                 
16 The analysis of the remainder of the paper and all results in Tables 6 through 9 are based on the estimates of 
Model (i), which is our preferred model. 
17 We have checked the regularity conditions for the estimated quadratic function. Since homogeneity and 
symmetry is imposed during the estimation, we check for monotonicity and concavity. In our preferred model, 
95% of the observations satisfy monotonicity in input prices, while only 7 observations (6%) violate output 
monotonicity.  Concavity in input prices is also globally satisfied, i.e. the Hessian matrix is negative semi-
definite. 
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[Place Table 7 about here] 
Table 7 therefore provides various relevant findings. Firstly, it demonstrates that all 
potential partitions of the sample average firm’s output have higher costs than those of a fully 
integrated firm, which are 800.8 million dollars. Secondly, it also clearly demonstrates that 
vertical separation of the average firm is (i.e. partitions 10 to 14), even with full horizontal 
integration, yields relatively substantial and statistically significant excess cost estimates that 
range between 64.7 and 108.2 million dollars.  Moreover, comparison of partitions 10 and 13  
supports the findings of Table 6, as the horizontal separation of hydro generation into a 
separate generation firm is particularly costly.  
Thirdly, partition 4, where vertical integration of nuclear generation is maintained, 
while conventional and hydro generation are vertically separated but remain horizontally 
integrated is the least costly partition of the sample average firm’s outputs, resulting in a 
statistically insignificant increase of 2% in costs relative to a fully integrated structure.  We 
would argue that this result again highlights the importance of maintaining horizontal 
generation of G3 with other generation, but also indicates the significant benefit of vertical 
scope economies flowing from nuclear generation.  However, in general partitions which 
retain vertical integration with either nuclear or fossil fuel generation have moderate excess 
costs provided that hydro generation (G3) remains horizontally integrated with the 
nuclear/fossil fuel (e.g. partitions 4 and 5). Further, while there are strong vertical economies 
between a horizontally integrated generator producing G1 and G2 and distribution, there are 
relatively weak vertical economies flowing between G3 and distribution, as the relatively high 
costs of partitions 8 and 9 reflect.  Nevertheless, partition 1 shows that the separation of G3 
alone does not increase costs significantly, provided that both G1 and G2 remain integrated 
with D2. We believe that this is consistent with the fact that the vertical economies in system 
design are driven by base load sources (nuclear and conventional steam generators) rather 
than hydro plants. In general, hydro plants are used as regulators of the system in order to 
meet peak loads and to cover outages of the thermal units. Outages in hydro stations are so 
infrequent in comparison with thermal power plants that their outage rate can be treated as 
zero. Further, hydro power stations typically have higher transmission and distribution costs 
because plants are far from load centres. Additionally, the generally smaller size of hydro 
plants implies a larger number of units and more disperse locations. 
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6.3  The impact of size and generation composition on scope economies 
In order to measure the impact of firm size on scope economy estimates we consider 12 
different rescalings of total generation and distribution customers ranging from 0.25 to 3 
times the sample mean. Table 8 below reports global, vertical and horizontal scope economy 
estimates for the 12 x 12=144 resulting hypothetical firms, after holding the share of 
generation attributable to the 3 generation outputs constant at the sample average (i.e. shg1 = 
77.5% , shg2 = 20%, shg3 = 2.5%).  Moving along the diagonal in each panel, the sample 
average firm is scaled up and down while maintaining the same level of vertical integration 
(i.e. 619,200 customers and 14.58 million Mwh of total generation). Scope estimates for the 
average firm are highlighted in the three panels. 
[Place Table 8 about here] 
Panel A in Table 8 shows the global scope economy estimates. Thus, the value at the 
bottom-right corner indicates that the partition of a fully integrated company three times 
larger than the average firm (i.e. G = 43.74, D2 = 1,857.5) into four different companies 
would increase costs by 10.5%. Note that along the diagonal, the degree of global scope 
economy estimates do not vary too much when size is increased. In contrast, the cost of full 
separation is significantly higher for the smallest firm sizes. 
The other two panels in Table 8 decompose global scope economies into vertical and 
horizontal scope economies. Panel B reports vertical economies. All estimates in this panel 
are positive suggesting benefits from vertical integration for all sizes. This differs from 
previous studies (e.g. Kaserman and Mayo 1991, Kwoka, 2002), which found vertical 
diseconomies for the smallest sizes (roughly below 6 million Mwh of G and D).   
Furthermore, the negative impact that vertical separation has on costs is smaller in 
those firms less vertically balanced and more focused on generation, i.e. in those firms with 
high values of the G/D ratio located to the right of the diagonal. By contrast, firms with a 
large number of distribution customers relative to generation located below the diagonal are 
associated with higher economies of vertical integration. In this respect, our estimates in 
Table 8 seem to suggest a minimum size of generation from which any expansion in the level 
of distribution results in a greater ability to take advantage of cost savings from vertical 
integration. To see this, we explore the consequences of holding constant the total generation 
level and varying the number of customers, i.e. by moving vertically along each column of 
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panel B. Thus, from 10.93 million MWh’s, vertical scope economies are maximized at a 
distribution level which represents a larger scaling of the sample average firm than 
generation.  By contrast, it is observed that for the two smallest generation sizes (generation 
equal to ¼ and ½ of the sample average, respectively 3.64 and 7.20 million MWh’s, 
maximum vertical economies are attained with a smaller number of customers. 
Finally, Panel C in Table 8 shows the magnitude of horizontal scope economies. For 
the smallest scales, horizontal economies are more salient than vertical economies. In 
contrast, horizontal economies decrease as we consider larger multiples of the sample average 
firm. Moeover, horizontal diseconomies appear for companies larger than 25.51 MWh (twice 
the average firm), suggesting cost advantages related to scale and specialization. Accordingly, 
large (small) utilities would enjoy greater (lower) cost savings from vertical integration than 
from the integration of their generating structure.  
As discussed above (see Table 6), cost complementarities vary among different types 
of generation. Therefore, we should expect that the impact of unbundling policies on firms’ 
costs will differ according to their generation mix. In order to measure the impact of 
generation composition on the magnitude of scope economies, we hold total generation and 
distribution constant at the sample average but vary the share of total generation accounted for 
by conventional steam, nuclear, and hydro generation. Thus, in Table 9, the shares of nuclear 
and hydro generation are denoted by shg2 and shg3 respectively, and fossil fuel generation 
accounts for the balance. Estimates for the sample average firm’s actual generation shares are 
highlighted in each panel of Table 9, while the maximum (minimum) estimate from the 
potential 72 alternative generation shares employed in the table are marked in italic (bold).  
[Place Table 9 about here] 
Table 9 reveals that the estimates of scope economies, and consequently the expected 
effects of unbundling policies on the average firm’s costs, vary substantially with its 
generation mix. Panel A in Table 9 reveals that global scope economies range from 11.4 to 
27.2%. Similarly, Panels B and C in Table 9 show that vertical economies range from 3.3% to 
20.6% while horizontal economies range from 3.3 to 8.4%.  
Regarding full disintegration, the highest cost penalty would be suffered by a heavily 
nuclear based company (e.g. 90% nuclear, 8.75% steam, and 1.25% hydro generation), which 
is the generation mix that exhibits largest global scope estimates at the bottom-left corner of 
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Panel A.  In this case full unbundling would increase costs by 27.2% in comparison to those 
incurred by a fully integrated company. As Panel B and C show, costs increase 20.6% due to 
the loss of vertical economies and 6.6% because of the loss of horizontal economies. By 
contrast, the minimum impact of full separation would be for a company for which generation 
is 70% fossil-fuel based, 20% nuclear and 10% hydro. In this case, full separation would 
increase costs by 11.4%, mostly explained by the loss of economies of horizontal integration 
(6.7%), while vertical separation would imply a cost increase of 4.7%, as shown in Panel B. 
Panels B and C provide useful insights for unbundling policies. On the one hand, Panel B 
demonstrates that as the average firm’s nuclear generation increases, the larger the negative 
impact of vertical separation, due to the loss of vertical integration benefits between nuclear 
generation and distribution. In contrast, vertical separation would have a lesser effect when 
the generation of the average firm mostly relies on fossil-fuel and hydro plants. In contrast, 
Panel C highlights the fact that horizontal divestiture policies would raise costs more, the 
more generation is based on conventional and hydro generation.   
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
Vertical unbundling and divestiture is a key aspect of liberalization in many countries that 
undertake electricity restructuring.For example, during the privatisation of the UK electricity 
sector in 1990 the former stated-owned Central Electricity Generating Board was dismantled 
and split up into four companies: three generating-only companies (one of which exclusively 
operated nuclear generation), and one transmission company. Likewise, the Area Boards that 
were responsible for power distribution and supply were transformed into twelve Regional 
Electricity Companies. In the United States, as of February 2003 twenty-four states were 
active in the restructuring process while the rest were either not actively pursuing 
restructuring or had delayed the proposals (EIA 2003). In many of those states, mandatory 
and/or encouraged divestiture of generation assets was adopted. Thus, some state regulators 
provided strong financial incentives for vertically integrated utilities to divest generation 
(California did so for fossil-fuel generation), while in others (e.g. Arizona) utilities must 
divest all of their generation assets if they want complete recovery of stranded costs (EIA 
2000, 2003).  In this paper, we have estimated the economies of integration in the US power 
sector and thereby provide a reference for evaluating the potential costs of such unbundling 
policies.  
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Our results suggest a statistically significant and substantial cost savings associated 
with vertical integration, together with a further, but smaller cost saving associated with the 
horizontal integration of generation. Taken together, global scope savings from vertical and 
horizontal integration amount to as much as 13.5% of costs for the sample average firm and 
are statistically significant. The magnitude of our estimates of vertical and horizontal 
integration economies are substantial enough to give cause for thought, while also suggesting 
a number of considerations that should be carefully checked before implementing 
liberalisation polices. In this respect, our results provide useful insights to guide market 
restructuring, and the subsequent unbundling requirements and divestiture policies intended to 
create more favourable conditions for competition.  
As a general rule, policies favouring vertical separation to foster efficiency gains by 
facilitating competition can only be considered appropriate if the anticipated/realized gains 
from competition exceed the cost of foregone vertical scope economies. We would therefore 
argue that our finding of substantial and statistically significant vertical scope economies of 
8.1% for the sample average firm provide a not unsubstantial lower bound for the level of 
potential cost savings that must be obtainable before vertical unbundling can be justified on 
cost efficiency grounds.  Related to this, Delmas and Tolkat (2005) and Kwoka, et al (2008) 
find that deregulation in the US electric sector actually had a negative impact on the cost 
efficiency of utilities in the short term.  Moreover, Kwoka et al (2008) also specifically found 
that divestiture and the subsequent creation of standalone distributors negatively affected the 
operating efficiency of distribution utilities.  Therefore these studies actually provide evidence 
that supports our findings of substantial losses from foregone vertical scope economies.  
With regard to generation, Fabrizio et al (2007) find evidence that IOU generating 
plants in restructuring regimes reduced their labor and nonfuel operating expenses by 3 to 5 
percent in anticipation of increased competition in electricity generation, relative to IOU 
plants in states that did not restructure their markets.  Similarly, Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) 
find that a measure of fuel use per MWh declined by roughly 2% at divested IOU generation 
plants.  As these estimated efficiency gains are substantially below our estimate that stand 
alone generation costs would need to be reduced by 10.8% just to offset lost vertical scope 
economies for the sample average firm, our results suggest that these studies do not provide 
evidence that the benefits of generation divestiture were sufficient to offset the cost of lost 
vertical scope economies.   Moreover, as we also find that substantial horizontal scope 
economies exist between different types of generation, it is possible that further losses from 
generation divestiture may have occurred due to divestiture, which would not have been 
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captured by these plant level studies of generation cost efficiency.  Our results therefore 
suggest that policy makers should more carefully consider the potential benefits of vertical 
and horizontal integration in future regulatory decisions affecting the electricity industry’s 
structure.    
 
Finally, we would also note that, to our knowledge, our study is the first academic 
study to systematically analyse the impact of generation composition, which is often 
determined by historic investment patterns and can only be slowly changed due to the 
longevity of generation assets,  on both vertical and horizontal integration economies, As a 
result, we have been able to clearly demonstrate that the composition of generation has 
significant effects on vertical and horizontal scope economy estimates.   Composition of 
generation matters due to the relatively complex interrelationship  between different 
technologies and  diversification economies. Thus, for example, our results suggest that the 
separation of nuclear generation from distribution implies substantial vertical economy losses.  
This has important policy implications regarding the implementation of unbundling 
requirements. Thus, for a power system that relies on nuclear power (e.g. France), vertical 
unbundling may result in significantly higher costs. In contrast, our results suggest that 
vertical separation of electrical systems based more on hydroelectric generation (e.g. Norway) 
would arguably have a relatively lower impact on costs.  Focusing more specifically on the 
United States, our results specifically demonstrate that for the sample average IOU, 
substantial disintegration costs can be best avoided by maintaining vertical integration of 
nuclear generation, with divestiture of fossil and nuclear generation in a single horizontally 
integrated generation firm.   Thus, our results also suggest that policy makers should carefully 
consider a system’s generation characteristics before determining the appropriateness of 
policies that would alter the vertical and/or horizontal structure of the electricity sector.   
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TABLE 1. Empirical research on economies of vertical integration in the electricity industry  
 
Paper Sample characteristics Variables Functional specification 
and methodology 
Main findings 
Henderson 
(1985) 
160 US IOUs in 1970 ),,,,,,,( 201716111215 ZZZwwwYYfC
fkl=  Translog cost function and 
cost share equation system 
SUR 
Separability of cost function between stages is 
rejected 
Roberts (1986) 65 US IOUs in 1978 ),,,,,,,( 261261318174 ZZwwwYYYfC
pkl=  Translog cost function and 
input share equations SUR 
Separability of cost function between stages is 
rejected 
Eftekhari (1989) 61 US electric firms from 
1986  
Each utility generating at 
least 80% by steam and no 
nuclear capacity. 
),,,,,,,( 18141311913 ZwwwYYYYfC
fkl=  
 
Box cox transformation of 
translog cost function and 
cost share equations. SUR 
Diseconomies of joint production 
Kaserman and 
Mayo (1991) 
74 US IOUs in 1981 
 
50 G+D 
14 D 
10 G 
),,,,,,
,,,,,,,,(
24232218765
421231211
ZZZZZZZ
ZZwwwwYYfC pfkl=  Flexible Fixed Costs Quadratic cost function. 
OLS 
Vertical cost complementarities: 
11.96% cost savings at the sample mean (G= 
9,009 MWh; D= 7,259 MWh) 
Very small firms (G<6,000; D<6,000) do not 
show vertical economies 
Gilsdorf (1994) 72 US IOUs in 1985 
All vertically integrated 
Each utility must have G at 
least 65% from non-nuclear 
steam 
),,,,,,( 81614822 ZwwwYYYfC
fkl=  Translog cost function and 
factor share equations 
SUR.  
Evidence against cost complementarity for the 3 
output set  
 
 
Gilsdorf (1995) 72 US IOUs in 1985 
All vertically integrated 
 
Each utility must have G at 
least 65% from non-nuclear 
steam 
),,,,,,,( 12118161422 ZZZwwwYYfC
fkl=  Translog cost function and 
factor share equations SUR 
No evidence of subadditivity for vertically 
integrated firms  
 
Lee (1995) 70 US IOUs in 1990 ),,,,,( 65432114 XXXXXXfY =  Translog production function and cost share 
equations SUR 
Rejects separability hypothesis. separating the 
functions of generation, transmission, and 
distribution will result in loss of technical 
efficiency 
 
Thompson 
(1997) 
85 US IOUs for the years 
1977,1982,1987,1992 
),,,,,,,( 2612618174 tZZwwwYYfC
pkl=  Translog cost function and 
cost share equations 
Rejection of separability hypothesis 
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Table 1. continued 
 
Paper Sample characteristics Variables Functional specification 
and methodology 
Main findings 
Hayashi et al 
(1997) 
50 US IOUs from  1986-1987 
Each utility must have G at 
least 85% from non-nuclear 
steam 
),,,
,,,,,,(
271813
3331144
tZZZ
ZwwwwYfC pfkl=
 
Translog cost function and 
cost share equations for 
generation, 
and for vertical integration 
Separability of generation from T-D is 
rejected. 
Vertical economies:  
13.9% -16.8% 
Kwoka 
(2002) 
147 US IOUs in 1989 
 
),,,,,
,,,,,,,,(
231918151411
1075111412
ZZZZZZ
ZZZwwwYYfC fkl=
 
Quadratic cost function 
OLS 
Substantial scope economies. 13%-57% 
43% for the average firm (G=15.4 ; D=13.6) 
Jara-Díaz et 
al (2004) 
12 Spanish utilities 
1985-1996 
),
,,,,,,,,,(
2911
1351276432
tZZ
wwwwYYYYYfC ifkl=
 
Quadratic cost function 
and factor share equations 
SUR 
Scope economies between G and D: 6.5% 
for the average firm (G:8,200; D: 11,350) 
Horizontal (G) economies: 9.1-10% 
Full specialization (full unbundling): 28.1% 
Nemoto and 
Goto (2004) 
9 vertically integrated 
Japanese utilities 1981-1998 
 
),,,,,,(* 11191 tZwwwYYfC
pkl=  Symmetric generalized 
McFadden SUR 
EVI exist because of technological 
externalities between G and T-D: 
 
Ida & 
Kuwahara 
(2004) 
 
9 vertically integrated 
Japanese utilities 1978-1998 
 
),,,,,,,(* 29114791 tZZwwwYYfC
fkl=  Translog cost function and 
input share equations SUR 
Cost complementarities between G and TD 
Houldin 
(2005) 
Ontario electricity system, 
Canada 1996-2003 
---- Case study: Analysis of 
costsfollowing the Ontario 
system restructuring 
5% of cost increases due to the loss of 
economies of integration (scale and scope) 
Fraquelli et al 
(2005) 
25 Italian municipal 
utilities1994-2000 
(14 vertically 
integrated, 11 distribution 
only) 
 
),,,,,,( 251021216 tZZwwYYfC
il=  Composite Cost Function 
NLSUR 
 3% for the average firm (G: 300 and 
D=600) 
Other hedonic characeristics (Z   ) are  
Arocena 
(2008) 
12 Spanish utilities 
1989-1997 
),,,,,( 28181713542 ZYYYYYfC =  Non parametric cost frontier. Data 
Envelopment Analysis 
Cost and quality gains from vertical 
integration  (between 1.1%-4.9%) 
and horizontal integration (1.3%-4.3%) 
Greer (2008) 831 US rural electric 
cooperatives 1997 
),,,,,,( 16101
*
16157 ZZwwwYYfC
plk=  Modified quadratic cost 
function. 
Substantial cost savings from vertical 
integration of rural cooperatives (above 40% 
associated at the sample mean, G: 320 GWH 
D: 300 GWH 
 37
C1 = Total utility operating expenses 
C2 = O&M expenses + imputed capital expenditures – costs 
of purchased power 
C3 = Total costs excluding sales, consumers accounts and 
administration costs. 
C4 = Total cost of electric supply (including the cost of 
purchased and generated power) 
C5 = The sum of labor, capital and fuel expenses 
C6 = The sum of labor and other inputs (defined as the sum of 
depreciation, maintenance, materials and services, but 
excluding the costs of purchased power) 
C7 = Operating expenses + interest on long-term debt 
 
Y1= Net generation (MWHs) 
Y2= Power generated by fossil fuel plants (MWHs) 
Y3= Power generated by nuclear plants (MWHs) 
Y4= Power generated by hydro plants (MWHs) 
Y5= Power generated by thermal plants (including fossil fuel 
and nuclear) 
Y6= Power generated from coal  
Y7= Power generated from oil&gas 
Y8= Circuit-voltage miles 
Y9= Index of interconnected activity (Interchange + wheeling 
power /Average power exchange) 
Y10= Circuit-voltage miles * Number of Contracts  
Y11 =Percentage of total sales to ultimate consumers 
Y12= Power distributed to final consumers (MWHs) 
Y13= Number of ultimate consumers 
Y14= Sales for resale plus ultimate sales (MWHs) 
Y15= Electricity distributed to residential and small 
commercial customers (MWHs) 
Y16= Electricity distributed to industrial and large 
commercial customers (MWHs) 
Y17= High voltage distributed power  
Y18= Low voltage distributed power 
 
X1 = Capital stock of generation 
X2 = Capital stock in transmission 
X3 = Capital stock in distribution 
X4 = Labor used in generation 
X5 = Labor used in distribution 
X6 = Fuel used in generation 
 
wl = Price of labor ($/worker) 
wk1= Price of capital (WACC of common stock, preferred 
stock and long-term debt) 
wk2= Price of capital (interest on LTD/LTD) 
wk3= Price of capital (yield to maturity on long-term bonds) 
wk4= Price of capital (Cost of capital/net generation) 
wk5= Price of capital ((Depreciation + Rate of 
Return*Equity)/Tangible fixed assets) 
wk6= Divisia price index constructed from individual capital 
service prices calculated for each asset class  
wk7= Price of capital (ida and kuwahara) 
wf 1= Fuel price (fuel costs/million BTUs) 
wf 2 = Fuel price (weighted average cost of steam and nuclear 
fuel per MWh of generation) 
wf 3= Fuel price (Cost of fossil fuels/Power generated from 
fossil fuels) 
wf 4= Fuel price (Total fuel expenses/Heat consumption of 
conversion into heavy oil) 
wp1= Price of purchased power (cost of purchased power/total 
MWh) 
wp2= Price of electricity procurement = weighted average 
price of purchased and own-generated power. 
wp3= Price of generated electricity 
wi1= Price of other inputs (Expenditures in intermediate 
inputs/Net revenues) 
wi2= Price of other inputs 
((Depreciation+Maintenance+Materials+Services)/Sum of 
generated and distributed power)) 
 
Z1= Square miles of service territory 
Z2= Regional dummy (census region) 
Z3= Regional dummy (South, Southwest, Northeast) 
Z4= Percentage of residential and industrial customers 
Z5= Percentage of nuclear capacity 
Z6= Percentage of gas capacity 
Z7= Percentage of hydro capacity 
Z8= Density (number of distribution meters per square mile 
of service territory) 
Z9= Customer density (number of customers per square mile) 
Z10= Customer density (number of customers per distribution 
mile) 
Z11= Percentage of utilization of generating capacity  
Z12= Percentage of sales to ultimate consumers 
Z13= Percentage of sales to residential consumers 
Z14= Percentage of high voltage sold 
Z15= Average usage per customer class 
Z16= Miles of transmission line 
Z17= Number of distribution line transformers  
Z18= Dummy variable for holding company 
Z19= Dummy for power pool membership 
Z20= Heating plus cooling degree days in the principal city 
served by the utility 
Z21= Share of underground distribution lines  
Z22= Percentage of underground distribution expenses 
Z23= Generation dummy 
Z24= Distribution dummy 
Z25= Firm size dummies (small, medium, large) 
Z26= Number of customers 
Z27= Technology index in transmission and distribution = line 
losses/delivered electricity 
Z28= Quality of service (interruptions of supply) 
Z29= Firm specific dummies 
 
t = time trend 
* Not detailed 
 38
TABLE 2. Sample descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Outputs         
D1-Distribution Mwh (000) (Full Service+Dist.Only) 16,890 19,861 0 102,526 
D2-Distribution Customers (000) (Full Service+Dist. Only) 619 762 0 4,474 
G- Generation Mwh (000) 14,580 18,878 0 85,827 
G1-Fossil Fuel Generation Mwh (000)  11,294 14,159 0 67,504 
G2- Nuclear Generation Mwh (000) 2,921 6,212 0 38,254 
G3- Hydro  Generation Mwh (000) 365 931 0 5,638 
Costs         
TC - Total Costs  (millions) 770.7 943.7 4.2 5,160.5 
KC - Capital Costs  (millions) 266.3 342.7 1.2 1,981.6 
FC - Total Fuel Costs  (millions) 241.7 353.6 0.0 2,250.8 
F1C -Conventional Fuel Costs (millions) 227.9 336.3 0.0 2,152.6 
F2C - Nuclear Fuel Costs (millions) 13.7 29.0 0.0 171.8 
LC - Labour Costs  (millions) 91.3 123.0 0.3 641.0 
OC - Other Costs  (millions) 171.4 193.2 1.9 932.5 
          
DC - Distribution Costs  (millions) 240.6 297.4 0.0 1,676.6 
GC - Generation Costs  (millions) 530.1 714.1 0.0 4,141.3 
Input Prices         
K - Capital Price (per $) 0.142 0.010 0.128 0.231 
F - Total Fuel Price (per million BTU) 1.81 1.12 0.40 8.19 
F1 - Conventional  Fuel Price (per million BTU) 2.20 1.25 0.53 8.19 
F2 - Nuclear Fuel Price (per million BTU) 0.44 0.03 0.34 0.56 
L - Labour Price (census) 65,761 8,081 45,283 85,437 
O - Other  Costs Price Deflator 1.00 0.16 0.73 1.63 
Input Quantities         
XK - Capital Stock ($) (millions) 1,864.8 2,373.1 8.6 14,084.8 
XF - Total Fuel (billions of BTU) 148,509 192,921 0 937,501 
XF1 - Conventional Fuel (billions of BTU) 117,286 146,414 0 745,759 
XF2 - Nuclear Fuel (billions of BTU) 31,222 66,826 0 408,254 
XL - Employees 1,385 1,832 4 10,163 
Operating Characteristics and Dummy Variables         
RESDENS -  Dist. Mwh per Residential Customer          9.80          3.75                  -               16.77 
NRESDENS -  Dist. Mwh per Nonresidential Customer      134.28        62.35                  -             372.61 
DENSITY - D2/Total Network Length        34.71        24.06                  -             175.82 
DSHRFULL - Full Service Customers/D2          0.91          0.25                  -                 1.00 
OHSHARE - Overhead Lines/Total Network Length          0.66          0.31                  -                 1.00 
LOADFACT - Avg. Hourly Demand/Peak Hourly Demand          0.50          0.15                  -                 0.78 
SYSTEMUT -G/Generation Capacity        44.67        25.84                  -               89.99 
FOSSILS- Fossil Fuel Generation Dummy          0.75          0.43                  -                 1.00 
NUKES  - Nuclear Fuel Generation Dummy          0.33          0.47                  -                 1.00 
HYDROS - Hydro Fuel Generation Dummy          0.39          0.49                  -                 1.00 
DISTS - Distribution Dummy          0.94          0.24                  -                 1.00 
(116 observations)         
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TABLE 3. Sample averages by firm type 
 
Variable 
Full 
Sample
All Integ.  
Firms
Integ. with 
G1,G2,& G3
Integ.  with 
G1 & G2 
Integ. with 
G1 & G3
Integ.  
with G1
Integ.  
with G2
Integ.  
with G3
Gen. Only 
Firms
Dist. Only 
Firms 
Outputs             
D1-Distribution Mwh (000) (Full Service+Dist.Only) 16,890 20,307 32,714 42,794 14,870 9,994 7,174 645 0 8,199 
D2-Distribution Customers (000) (Full Service+Dist. Only) 619 734 1,201 1,559 506 336 573 22 0 343 
G- Generation Mwh (000) 14,580 18,903 31,898 33,928 14,691 9,953 3,288 174 3,978 0 
G1-Fossil Fuel Generation Mwh (000)  11,294 14,742 20,622 24,980 13,765 9,953 0 0 1,836 0 
G2- Nuclear Generation Mwh (000) 2,921 3,690 10,244 8,948 0 0 3,288 0 2,013 0 
G3- Hydro  Generation Mwh (000) 365 471 1,033 0 926 0 0 174 130 0 
Costs                     
TC - Total Costs  (millions) 770.7 963.5 1,557.8 2,128.0 628.1 487.9 349.8 14.3 147.4 169.4 
KC - Capital Costs  (millions) 266.3 326.7 574.4 711.9 212.6 137.0 116.7 5.7 62.6 81.0 
FC - Total Fuel Costs  (millions) 241.7 315.8 390.5 835.2 211.8 205.2 14.7 0.0 32.1 0.0 
F1C -Conventional Fuel Costs (millions) 227.9 298.5 341.4 795.4 211.8 205.2 0.0 0.0 23.7 0.0 
F2C - Nuclear Fuel Costs (millions) 13.7 17.3 49.1 39.8 0.0 0.0 14.7 0.0 8.4 0.0 
LC - Labour Costs  (millions) 91.3 113.2 222.0 198.9 70.6 48.7 38.5 3.6 16.3 24.8 
OC - Other Costs  (millions) 171.4 207.9 370.9 381.9 133.2 97.1 179.9 5.0 36.4 63.6 
                      
DC - Distribution Costs  (millions) 240.6 276.8 472.0 571.9 184.4 120.2 236.3 9.3 0.0 169.4 
GC - Generation Costs  (millions) 530.1 686.8 1,085.8 1,556.1 443.8 367.7 113.5 4.9 147.4 0.0 
Input Prices                     
K - Capital Price (per $) 0.142 0.142 0.145 0.145 0.139 0.139 0.142 0.149 0.160 0.139 
F - Total Fuel Price (per million BTU) 1.81 1.89 1.19 2.16 2.10 2.29 0.43 1.83 1.14 1.83 
F1 - Conventional  Fuel Price (per million BTU) 2.20 2.25 1.63 3.83 2.10 2.29 2.20 2.20 2.41 2.20 
F2 - Nuclear Fuel Price (per million BTU) 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.44 
L - Labour Price (census) 65,761 64,775 66,167 65,359 63,706 63,168 75,307 69,534 65,169 70,089 
O - Other  Costs Price Deflator 1.00 0.97 1.01 1.00 0.96 0.92 1.18 1.09 0.96 1.12 
Input Quantities                     
XK - Capital Stock ($) (millions) 1,864.8 2,284.9 3,967.8 4,928.5 1,528.3 982.0 822.9 38.1 409.8 589.1 
XF - Total Fuel (billions of BTU) 148,509 191,910 323,682 358,193 141,600 101,527 34,751 0 38,747 0 
XF1 - Conventional Fuel (billions of BTU) 117,286 152,420 213,519 263,462 141,600 101,527 0 0 17,796 0 
XF2 - Nuclear Fuel (billions of BTU) 31,222 39,490 110,163 94,731 0 0 34,751 0 20,951 0 
XL - Employees 1,385 1,723 3,323 2,987 1,111 780 476 52 263 340 
Operating Characteristics and Dummy Variables                     
RESDENS -  Dist. Mwh per Residential Customer          9.80        10.81             10.34             11.49             10.55        11.51          7.10          8.46                -               8.83  
NRESDENS -  Dist. Mwh per Nonresidential Customer      134.28      145.69           145.35           160.03           146.44      144.90      106.14      139.14                -           131.21  
DENSITY - D2/Total Network Length        34.71        37.38             30.18             40.97             39.42        37.84        65.46        19.95                -             35.13  
DSHRFULL - Full Service Customers/D2          0.91          0.98             0.974             0.974             0.987        0.997        0.916        1.000                -             0.916  
OHSHARE - Overhead Lines/Total Network Length          0.66          0.69               0.67               0.72               0.72          0.67          0.78          0.82                -               0.76  
LOADFACT - Avg. Hourly Demand/Peak Hourly Demand          0.50          0.53               0.51               0.54               0.58          0.51          0.46          0.56                -               0.56  
SYSTEMUT -G/Generation Capacity        44.67        53.62             55.91             50.92             50.35        53.22        70.32        58.38           66.09                 -    
FOSSILS- Fossil Fuel Generation Dummy          0.75          0.95               1.00               1.00               1.00          1.00              -                -               0.43                 -    
NUKES  - Nuclear Fuel Generation Dummy          0.33          0.40               1.00               1.00                   -                -            1.00              -               0.43                 -    
HYDROS - Hydro Fuel Generation Dummy          0.39          0.49               1.00                   -                 1.00              -                -            1.00             0.29                 -    
DISTS - Distribution Dummy          0.94          1.00               1.00               1.00               1.00          1.00          1.00          1.00                -               1.00  
Observations           116             88                  22                  10                  20             32               3               1                  7                21  
 
 40
TABLE 4. Model selection tests 
 
Model Log Likelihood Function Values             
Model number: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Fuel prices: F1,F2 F1,F2 F F F F 
Distribution outputs: D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 
Generation outputs: G1,G2,G3 G1,G2,G3 G1,G2,G3 G1,G2,G3 G G 
(1) Base Cost Function Model -9,470.42 -9,480.11 -7,667.60 -7,676.17 -7,755.48 -7,755.69 
(2) Regional Dummies -9,456.18 -9,468.03 -7,658.67 -7,668.43 -7,743.40 -7,746.06 
(3) Regional dummies, and 7 operating 
characteristics 
-9,455.37 -9,463.43 -7,657.79 -7,664.15 -7,742.17 -7,743.64 
Number of parameters in base cost function models 45 45 36 36 21 21 
       
 LR Test Statistics for Restrictions  Involving operating characteristics       
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Restriction of (3) to (2)     (d.f.:7) 1.62 9.20 1.77 8.56 2.47 4.83 
Restriction of (2) to (1)     (d.f.:9) 28.49 24.17 17.85 15.47 24.16 19.26 
       
 LR Test Statistics for Restrictions Involving Output Variables          
   Restrictions   
      (iii) vs (v) (d.f.:15) 
(iv) vs (vi) 
(d.f.:15)     
(1) Base Cost Function Model     175.77 159.05     
(2) Regional Dummies     169.46 155.25     
(3) Regional dummies, and 7 operating 
characteristics 
  168.77 158.98   
       
 LR Test Statistics for Restriction of a Two Fuel Specification to a Single Fuel Specification    
  
 Restricted Specification     
  (i)  (d.f.:9) 
 (ii) 
(d.f.:9)       
(1) Base Cost Function Model 796.71 749.31       
(2) Regional Dummies 784.17 725.47       
(3) Regional dummies, and 7 operating 
characteristics 
756.98 731.46       
Note: Test statistics in bold (bold italic) are significant at 0.10 (0.05) level 
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TABLE 5. Estimates for the sample average firm in the alternative models 
Model number: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Fuel prices: F1,F2 F1,F2 F F F F 
Distribution outputs: D2 D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 
Generation outputs: G1,G2,G3 G1,G2,G3 G1,G2,G3 G1,G2,G3 G G 
Cost Elasticities       
G- Total Generation (Mwh)     0.709 0.551 
G1- Fossil Fuel Generation (Mwh) 0.553 0.409 0.494 0.347   
G2- Nuclear Generation (Mwh) 0.138 0.113 0.194 0.169   
G3- Hydro Generation (Mwh) 0.012 0.007 0.013 0.010   
D1 - Distribution Units Delivered (Mwh)  0.441  0.453  0.442 
D2 - Distribution Customers 0.263  0.276  0.281  
       
Economies of Scale       
global 1.035 1.031 1.024 1.021 1.010 1.008 
in generation 0.953 0.911 0.954 0.926 0.966 0.919 
in distribution 0.948 0.980 0.944 0.995 0.968 0.899 
in the absence of vertical scope economies 0.952 0.942 0.951 0.958 0.967 0.910 
       
Scope Economies       
Vertical - between distribution and generation 0.081 0.086 0.071 0.062 0.043 0.097 
Total Horizontal - in generation 0.054 0.051 0.035 0.034    
-   
  
-   
Global 0.135 0.137 0.106 0.096                   -                     -   
       
Cost Estimates ($ millions)       
 Total Costs  800.8 805.2 799.7 806.2 802.8 803.0 
 Generation Only Costs  600.9 457.0 591.3 442.7 584.4 484.3 
 Distribution Only Costs  264.6 417.2 265.3 413.5 252.6 396.5 
 Vertical Scope Economy Savings  64.7 69.0 56.9 50.0 34.2 77.8 
 Horizontal Scope Economy Savings  43.5 41.4 27.7 27.0    
-   
  
-   
 Global Scope Economy Savings  108.2 110.4 84.6 77.0                  -                     -   
Note: Estimates in bold (bold italic) are significantly different from zero at 0.10 (0.05) level, except for 
economies of scale estimates which are statistically different from 1 at these levels 
 
 
TABLE 6 - Disaggregated Horizontal Scope Economy Estimates for the Sample Average 
Firm (millions of dollars) 
 Type of  
horizontal 
separation 
Unbundled versus integrated  
generation costs 
Cost Savings 
From 
Horizontal 
Integration 
Savings Relative 
to Fully 
Integrated Cost 
G3 and G1,G2 C(G1,G2,0,0) + C(0,0,G3,0) - C(G1,G2,G3,0) 33.20 0.041 
G2 and G1  C(G1,0,0,0) + C(0,G2,0,0) - C(G1,G2,0,0) 10.26 0.013 
G2 and G1,G3 C(G1,0,G3,0) + C(0,G2,0,0) - C(G1,G2,G3,0) 8.66 0.011 
G3 and  G1 C(G1,0,0,0) + C(0,0,G3,0) - C(G1,0,G3,0) 34.80 0.043 
G1and G2,G3 C(0,G2,G3,0) + C(G1,0,0,0) - C(G1,G2,G3,0) 14.79 0.018 
G2 and G3 C(0,G2,0,0) + C(0,0,G3,0) - C(0,G2,G3,0) 28.67 0.036 
    Note: Estimates in bold (bold italic) are significantly different from zero at 0.10 (0.05) level.
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TABLE 7. Estimated costs of the average firm’s output in alternative configurations 
(millions of dollars) 
Partition  
No 
 Structural configuration Estimated 
Cost 
Excess Relative 
to Fully 
Integrated Costs 
Excess Cost/Fully 
Integrated Costs 
 Fully Integrated 
      
 C(G1,G2,G3,D2) 800.8 - - 
 Vertical Integration with Two Types of Generation 
  
1 C(G1,G2,0,D2)+C(0,0,G3,0) 825.3 24.5 0.031 
2 C(0,G2,G3,D2)+C(G1,0,0,0,0) 831.9 31.2 0.039 
3 C(G1,0,G3,D2)+C(0,G2,0,0) 836.2 35.2 0.044 
 Vertical Integration with One Type of Generation 
  
4 C(0,G2,0,D2)+C(G1,0,G3,0) 817.2 16.4 0.020 
5 C(G1,0,0,D2)+C(0,G2,G3,0) 833.7 32.9 0.041 
6 C(0,G2,0,D2)+C(G1,0,0,0)+C(0,0,G3,0) 851.9 51.2 0.064 
7 C(G1,0,0,D2)+C(0,G2,0,0)+C(0,0,G3,0) 862.4 61.6 0.077 
8 C(0,0,G3,D2)+C(G1,G2,0,0) 877.1 76.3 0.095 
9 C(0,0,G3,D2)+C(G1,0,0,0)+C(0,G2,0,0) 887.4 86.6 0.108 
 Vertically Separated  but Fully Horizontally Integrated 
  
10 C(0,0,0,D2)+C(G1,G2,G3,0) 865.5 64.7 0.081 
 Vertically Separated with Partial Horizontal Integration 
  
11 C(0,0,0,D2)+C(0,G2,0,0)+C(G1,0,G3,0) 874.2 73.4 0.092 
12 C(0,0,0,D2)+C(G1,0,0,0)+C(0,G2,G3) 880.3 79.5 0.099 
13 C(0,0,0,D2)+C(0,0,G3,0)+C(G1,G2,0) 898.7 97.9 0.122 
 Vertically Separated with Full Horizontal Disintegration 
  
14 C(0,0,0,D2)+C(G1,0,0,0)+C(0,G2,0,0)+C(0,0,G3,0) 909.0 108.2 0.135 
Note: Estimates in bold (bold italic) are significant at 0.10 (0.05) level 
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TABLE  8 - Scope Economy Estimates Rescaling  the Average Firm and Holding Generation Shares 
Equal to those of the Sample Average Firm.  
Panel A. Global scope economies          
   G - assuming sample average firm's generartion shares shG1=0.775, shG2=0.20, shG3=0.025    
D2      3.64       7.29     10.93     14.58    18.22    21.87    25.51    29.16    32.80     36.45     40.09    43.74 
        154.8  0.413 0.251 0.174 0.127 0.094 0.069 0.048 0.031 0.017 0.004 -0.008 -0.019
        309.6  0.338 0.229 0.170 0.130 0.101 0.079 0.060 0.044 0.029 0.017 0.005 -0.006
        464.4  0.287 0.212 0.166 0.133 0.108 0.088 0.070 0.055 0.042 0.029 0.018 0.007
        619.2  0.250 0.197 0.162 0.135 0.114 0.096 0.080 0.066 0.053 0.041 0.030 0.020
        773.9  0.222 0.185 0.158 0.137 0.119 0.103 0.089 0.076 0.064 0.053 0.042 0.032
        928.7  0.199 0.175 0.155 0.138 0.123 0.109 0.097 0.085 0.074 0.063 0.053 0.044
     1,083.5  0.181 0.166 0.152 0.139 0.127 0.115 0.104 0.094 0.083 0.074 0.064 0.055
     1,238.3  0.167 0.158 0.149 0.139 0.130 0.120 0.111 0.102 0.092 0.083 0.075 0.066
     1,393.1  0.154 0.151 0.146 0.140 0.133 0.125 0.117 0.109 0.101 0.093 0.084 0.076
     1,547.9  0.144 0.145 0.144 0.140 0.135 0.129 0.123 0.116 0.109 0.101 0.094 0.086
     1,702.7  0.135 0.140 0.141 0.140 0.137 0.133 0.128 0.122 0.116 0.110 0.103 0.096
     1,857.5  0.127 0.135 0.139 0.140 0.139 0.136 0.133 0.128 0.123 0.117 0.111 0.105
Panel B. Vertical scope economies          
   G - assuming sample average firm's generartion shares shG1=0.775, shG2=0.20, shG3=0.025    
D2      3.64       7.29     10.93     14.58    18.22    21.87    25.51    29.16    32.80     36.45     40.09    43.74 
        154.8  0.146 0.096 0.073 0.060 0.051 0.045 0.041 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.029
        309.6  0.124 0.094 0.078 0.068 0.061 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.047 0.045 0.043 0.042
        464.4  0.110 0.092 0.082 0.075 0.070 0.066 0.063 0.061 0.059 0.057 0.055 0.054
        619.2  0.099 0.090 0.085 0.081 0.078 0.075 0.073 0.071 0.070 0.068 0.067 0.066
        773.9  0.090 0.089 0.087 0.086 0.085 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.080 0.079 0.078 0.077
        928.7  0.084 0.087 0.089 0.090 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.090 0.090 0.089 0.089 0.088
     1,083.5  0.079 0.086 0.091 0.094 0.096 0.097 0.098 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.098
     1,238.3  0.074 0.085 0.092 0.097 0.101 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.107 0.108 0.108 0.109
     1,393.1  0.070 0.083 0.093 0.100 0.105 0.109 0.112 0.114 0.116 0.117 0.118 0.118
     1,547.9  0.067 0.082 0.093 0.102 0.109 0.114 0.118 0.121 0.123 0.125 0.126 0.127
     1,702.7  0.064 0.081 0.094 0.104 0.112 0.118 0.123 0.127 0.130 0.133 0.134 0.136
     1,857.5  0.062 0.080 0.094 0.106 0.115 0.122 0.128 0.133 0.137 0.140 0.142 0.144
Panel  C. Horizontal scope economies         
   G - assuming sample average firm's generartion shares shG1=0.775, shG2=0.20, shG3=0.025    
D2      3.64       7.29     10.93     14.58    18.22    21.87    25.51    29.16    32.80     36.45     40.09    43.74 
        154.8  0.267 0.156 0.101 0.067 0.042 0.023 0.007 -0.006 -0.018 -0.029 -0.039 -0.048
        309.6  0.214 0.136 0.092 0.062 0.040 0.022 0.007 -0.006 -0.018 -0.028 -0.038 -0.047
        464.4  0.177 0.120 0.084 0.058 0.038 0.021 0.007 -0.006 -0.017 -0.028 -0.038 -0.047
        619.2  0.151 0.107 0.077 0.054 0.036 0.020 0.007 -0.006 -0.017 -0.027 -0.037 -0.046
        773.9  0.131 0.096 0.071 0.051 0.034 0.019 0.006 -0.005 -0.016 -0.026 -0.036 -0.045
        928.7  0.116 0.088 0.066 0.048 0.032 0.019 0.006 -0.005 -0.016 -0.026 -0.035 -0.044
     1,083.5  0.103 0.080 0.061 0.045 0.031 0.018 0.006 -0.005 -0.015 -0.025 -0.035 -0.043
     1,238.3  0.093 0.074 0.057 0.042 0.029 0.017 0.006 -0.005 -0.015 -0.025 -0.034 -0.043
     1,393.1  0.084 0.068 0.053 0.040 0.028 0.016 0.006 -0.005 -0.015 -0.024 -0.033 -0.042
     1,547.9  0.077 0.063 0.050 0.038 0.027 0.016 0.005 -0.005 -0.014 -0.023 -0.032 -0.041
     1,702.7  0.071 0.059 0.047 0.036 0.025 0.015 0.005 -0.004 -0.014 -0.023 -0.032 -0.040
     1,857.5  0.065 0.055 0.044 0.034 0.024 0.015 0.005 -0.004 -0.013 -0.022 -0.031 -0.039
Note:  Each element of the matrices indicates the scope economy estimate for production equivalent to the total 
generation and distribution outputs respectively associated with each column and row. 
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TABLE 9. Scope Economies with Sample Avg. Generation and Distribution but With Alternative 
Generation Shares 
 
 
Panel A. Global scope economies 
       
   shg3               
shg2 0.0125 0.025 0.0375 0.050 0.0625 0.075 0.0875 0.100 
0.10         0.136          0.133          0.131          0.128          0.126          0.123          0.120          0.117  
0.20         0.138          0.135          0.132          0.128          0.125          0.121          0.118          0.114  
0.30         0.144          0.140          0.136          0.132          0.128          0.124          0.119          0.114  
0.40         0.154          0.150          0.145          0.140          0.135          0.130          0.124          0.119  
0.50         0.168          0.163          0.157          0.151          0.145          0.139          0.133          0.127  
0.60         0.186          0.180          0.173          0.167          0.160          0.153          0.146          0.139  
0.70         0.209          0.202          0.195          0.187          0.179          0.171          0.163          0.155  
0.80         0.238          0.229          0.221          0.212          0.203          0.194          0.185          0.176  
0.90         0.272          0.262          0.253          0.243          0.233          0.223          0.212          0.202  
                  
Panel B. Vertical scope economies 
       
   shg3               
shg2 0.0125 0.025 0.0375 0.050 0.0625 0.075 0.0875 0.100 
0.10         0.072          0.067          0.061          0.056          0.050          0.044          0.039          0.033  
0.20         0.086          0.081          0.075          0.070          0.064          0.059          0.053          0.047  
0.30         0.101          0.095          0.090          0.084          0.079          0.073          0.067          0.061  
0.40         0.116          0.110          0.105          0.099          0.093          0.088          0.082          0.076  
0.50         0.132          0.126          0.120          0.114          0.109          0.103          0.097          0.091  
0.60         0.148          0.142          0.137          0.131          0.125          0.119          0.113          0.107  
0.70         0.166          0.160          0.154          0.148          0.141          0.135          0.129          0.123  
0.80         0.185          0.179          0.172          0.166          0.160          0.153          0.147          0.140  
0.90         0.206          0.199          0.193          0.186          0.179          0.172          0.165          0.158  
         
Panel C. Horizontal scope economies 
      
   shg3               
shg2 0.0125 0.025 0.0375 0.050 0.0625 0.075 0.0875 0.100 
0.10         0.064          0.067          0.070          0.073          0.076          0.078          0.081          0.084  
0.20         0.052          0.054          0.057          0.059          0.061          0.063          0.065          0.067  
0.30         0.043          0.045          0.047          0.048          0.049          0.051          0.052          0.053  
0.40         0.038          0.039          0.040          0.041          0.041          0.042          0.042          0.043  
0.50         0.036          0.037          0.037          0.037          0.037          0.037          0.036          0.036  
0.60         0.038          0.038          0.037          0.036          0.036          0.035          0.034          0.033  
0.70         0.043          0.042          0.041          0.039          0.038          0.036          0.034          0.033  
0.80         0.052          0.050          0.048          0.046          0.044          0.041          0.039          0.036  
0.90         0.066          0.063          0.060          0.057          0.054          0.050          0.047          0.043  
 
Note: shg1= conventional generation share; shg2=nuclear generation share; shg3=hydro generation share.  Each 
element of the matrices indicates the scope economy estimate for producing total output equivalent to the  
sample average firm’s total generation and distribution output, but assuming this generation is produced with 
shg2 and shg3 as respectively indicated in each row and column and shg1 = 1- shg2 - shg3. 
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FIGURE 1. North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Regions: 2001 
 
 
 
 
Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC) Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO) 
Southeastern Electric Reliability Council (SERC) Southwest Power Pool (SPP) 
Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) Mid-America Interconnected Network (MAIN) 
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) Mid-Atlantic Area Council (MAAC) 
East Central Area Reliability Council (ECAR) Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC) 
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Appendix Table - Parameter estimates for the preferred specification (Model i)  
Variable Coef. Std. Err.  Variable Coef. Std. Err. 
constant       800,794,000          12,690,200   Input Prices and Interactions 
Regional Dummies   BK    1,853,540,000          64,820,000  
BWECC         60,965,000          16,356,700   BL                  1,383                        56  
BMRO         21,361,900          18,466,800   BF1       116,405,000               965,329  
BERCOT         13,831,500          21,077,200   BF2         31,232,000               150,933  
BSERC         53,486,200          17,497,800      
BFRCC         16,128,600          24,028,600   BKK - 5,092,320,000     1,974,250,000  
BNPCC         30,081,200          17,727,500   BF1F1        -1,256,710               578,906  
BMAIN         16,538,200          17,636,800   BF2F2         -1,837,590            2,912,910  
BECAR         60,396,600          14,742,300   BLL               - 0.021                   0.009  
BMAAC         42,870,900          21,965,300      
    BF1K         67,725,300          22,778,000  
Outputs and Output Interactions  BF2K 545,838  9,375,390 
BG1                  39.22                     1.35   BKL             2,134.02              2,611.28  
BG2                  37.70                     2.84   BF1L                -20.89                   37.82  
BG3                  25.96                   18.96   BF2L                    8.66                   27.41  
BD2                340.62                   27.58   BF1F2        -45,909.46          108,358.44  
    Input Price and Output Interactions 
BG1G1        0.00000016         0.00000006   BG1K                  62.58                     6.22  
BG2G2     -0.00000020         0.00000021   BF1G1                  10.26                     0.09  
BG3G3        0.00000065         0.00000597   BF2G1          -0.012247               0.01533  
BD2D2        0.00005738         0.00002363   BG1L            0.000039             0.000006  
          
BG1G2        0.00000061         0.00000012   BG2K                  93.72                   14.28  
BG1G3      -0.00000110         0.00000035   BG2L              0.00011               0.00001  
BG2G3        0.00000150         0.00000109   BF1G2                -0.026                   0.215  
    BF2G2                10.664                   0.035  
BD2G1     - 0.00000234         0.00000079         
BD2G2      -0.00001480         0.00000300   BG3K                155.81                   77.78  
BD2G3        0.00003832         0.00000972   BG3L              0.00024               0.00007  
    BF1G3                 - 1.35                     1.17  
    BF2G3                    0.71                     0.18  
          
    BD2K             1,364.41                 126.93  
    BF1D2                  1.238                   1.838  
    BF2D2                  0.798                   0.327  
    BD2L                0.0008                 0.0001  
       
     Log-Likelihood -9,456.18 
 
Note: Parameters in bold (bold italic) are significant at 0.10 (0.05) level. 
  
 
